. 2 The twenty-five year extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) 3 included the controversial yet undeniably successful Section 5. 4 The VRA identifies districts with the worst histories of voting discrimination and subjects those "covered jurisdictions" to the obligations of Section 5. Section 5 requires jurisdictions within its coverage to apply for and receive approval, or "preclearance," 5 from the Attorney General 6 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [64:2
Congress chose to retain 1964, 1968, and 1972 as the baseline years. This failure to alter the coverage formula has created diverse criticism. 12 It has also fueled continuing concerns over the constitutionality of Section 5. The constitutional foundation of Section 5 and the protection it affords may be on the verge of collapse. 13 This is a worrisome prospect. Professor Cashin concludes that as long as "pronounced racial cleavages remain evident in party affiliation" there will be a significant risk of voting discrimination. 14 Perhaps the single most effective and important tool in the battle against voting discrimination, the end of Section 5 would be a monumental blow to the civil rights movement. 15 Further, it is unclear what, if any, phoenix would rise from the ashes of Section 5. 16 and Future Remedy?, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 225, 278-82 (2003) .
12. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 25-36 (2006) (additional views of Senators John Cornyn and Tom Coburn) (providing data that show significant improvement in AfricanAmerican voter registration and turnout in the covered jurisdictions, and arguing that the "systematic, invidious practices that plagued our election system 40 years ago" no longer exist and, thus, an alternative or updated coverage formula should have been Since Congress passed the VRA in 1965, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of Section 5 on numerous occasions. 17 In so doing, the Court acknowledged the questionable constitutional standing of Section 5 but recognized that "exceptional conditions" and "unique circumstances" may "justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate." 18 The debate over the current state of Section 5's constitutionality thus focuses on whether those conditions and circumstances that justified Section 5 in the past, or their modern day equivalents, still exist. Ultimately, this question will be framed by the standard of review the Supreme Court uses to determine the constitutionality of Section 5 19 and whether, under that standard, the legislative record is sufficient to justify the continuing need for Section 5's prophylactic approach to voting discrimination. 17. See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282-84 (1999) (recognizing the federalism concerns with Section 5 but holding that the Fifteenth Amendment permits intrusion into "areas traditionally reserved to the States" and thus ruling that the Voting Rights Act (VRA) was a permissible exercise of Congressional authority); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 535 (1973) (reaffirming the reasoning of Katzenbach that Section 5 is "a permissible exercise of congressional power under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment"); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) . In Katzenbach, the Court recognized the enduring problem of voting discrimination, the ineffectiveness of past methods of enforcement, and that discrimination was concentrated in certain areas of the country, thus ruling that Section 5 was a "permissible method of dealing with the problem" of voting discrimination. Id. at 328-29.
18. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334-35 (1966) (holding that the fact that the covered states were continuously developing and enacting new discriminatory rules with the clear purpose of evading unfavorable court rulings were "unique circumstances" and Section 5 was a reasonable congressional response); see also NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2510 (stating that past decisions upheld the VRA since "circumstances continued to justify the provisions"); id. at 2525-26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgement in part and dissenting in part) (arguing the discrimination justifying the previous decisions no longer exists).
19. This Essay argues that a stronger and more dynamic administrative approach, one that includes the authority to adjust the coverage and procedures of Section 5, can help ensure the continued constitutionality of Section 5 by better tailoring it to changing demographics and evolving needs. This would directly respond to the Supreme Court's concern that the current coverage may not be "sufficiently related to the problem that it targets" 20 by allowing coverage to be continuously adjusted to include the areas where problems exist. This Essay also maintains that an agency with authority to adjust both the procedures and coverage of Section 5 will be far more effective at combating modern-day voting discrimination on a national scale. Finally, this Essay posits that greater transparency in the preclearance process, along with specific reporting requirements and avenues to appeal grants of preclearance, will help reduce the risk of political abuse.
Part I of this Essay gives an overview of Section 5, the effect it has had in the covered jurisdictions, and the role of DOJ in its enforcement. Part II examines the constitutionality of Section 5, looking both at why it was constitutional in 1965 and why it remains constitutional today. Finally, Part III proposes that Congress amend the VRA to strengthen the reporting requirement for preclearance decisions, allow for the appeal of grants of preclearance, create a means by which jurisdictions may be added to Section 5 coverage, and establish a more efficient way for the removal of jurisdictions from coverage. This Essay is in no way meant to assert that Section 5, in its current form, is ineffective or unnecessary. It simply attempts to suggest reforms that would greatly strengthen the effectiveness and constitutional foundation of Section 5's protection now and in the future.
I. OVERVIEW
Congress passed the VRA in an attempt to remedy what it called the "painfully slow" progress in enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment 21 and the voting rights statutes in effect at the time. 22 It attributed this slow progress to the "intransigence of State and local officials" and the prolonged and costly judicial process of a case-by-case enforcement approach. 23 24. There are other vitally important provisions of the VRA. Section 2 represents the statutory embodiment of the Fifteenth Amendment's right to vote. It bans any voting practice or procedure "which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006) . Section 4 contains a provision that lists the requirements by which jurisdictions may bail out of Section 5 coverage, see id. § 1973b(a), the coverage formula, see id. § 1973b(b), and the statutory definitions of test and device used in the coverage formula, see id. § 1973b(c), (f)(3). Section 10 unequivocally bans the use of "poll taxes" as a prerequisite to the right to vote. See id.
§ 1973h. Finally, Section 203 requires that any jurisdiction where more than 5% or 10,000 citizens are "members of a single language minority and are limited-English proficient" must offer bilingual voting material. Id. § 1973aa-1a. 25. Technically the expiring provision is Section 4(a), codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(8), and applies only to Section 4, but since Section 5's coverage is specified in Section 4, the expiration of Section 4 would impliedly mean the end of Section 5. In addition to Section 4 and Section 5, the other temporary provision is Section 203, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a.
26 34 coverage is not inherently static. There is a "bailout" provision in the VRA that provides covered jurisdictions with a means of ending coverage by seeking declaratory judgment from the District Court of the District of Columbia. 35 The provision requires the jurisdiction to prove conformity with specific factors for the preceding ten years to a three-judge panel. 36 Broadly, the requirements demand that the panel find a "record of nondiscriminatory voting practices and current efforts to expand minority participation in all aspects of the political challenged in court and concluding "case-by-case adjudication through as-applied challenges is too slow to vindicate" the right to vote).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006); see Kousser, supra note 30, at 680 (asserting that shifting the burden of proof to the jurisdiction, along with the scrutiny of every voting change, was necessary to combat the innovative means of discriminating continuously implemented by the South); see also 28 C.F.R. § 51.54(b) (2011) (stating that a discriminatory effect will be found if the proposed voting change results in retrogression of a minority group's "effective exercise of the electoral franchise").
32. process." 37 Additionally, even if the plaintiff jurisdiction successfully meets its evidentiary burden, the court retains jurisdiction for the succeeding ten years and must reopen the proceedings upon a "motion of the Attorney General or any aggrieved person alleging that conduct has occurred which, had that conduct occurred during the ten-year periods" preceding the bailout litigation, "would have precluded the issuance of a declaratory judgment" for the jurisdiction. 38 If the violating conduct is proven, the declaratory judgment is vacated and Section 5 coverage is reinstated. 39 Despite this mechanism allowing a jurisdiction to escape Section 5 coverage, as of 2009, only seventeen out of over twelve thousand covered jurisdictions had successfully utilized the provision. 40 The reason for this low number is unclear, but it implies the bailout mechanism may need reform. 41
The Department of Justice and the Opportunity for Political Abuse
The DOJ is vital to the success of Section 5, 42 yet its role is surprisingly limited. Congress restricted DOJ's power by denying it meaningful regulatory authority over Section 5 and its coverage. 43 DOJ's accountability for its decisions is also significantly curtailed since grants of preclearance are not judicially reviewable 44 41. See Persily, Promise and Pitfalls, supra note 23, at 213-14 (advancing multiple possible theories as to why so few jurisdictions have bailed out); Pitts, supra note 11, at 284-85 (blaming the difficulty of the bailout provision for the low number of successful bailouts). But see Hebert, supra note 37, at 257 ("My experience indicates that the standards for establishing bailout eligibility that currently exist have proven to be both workable and practical."). See the entire Hebert article for a description of the bailout provision, including its history, a discussion of its requirements and the process that successful jurisdictions have followed, and a convincing case for why the current procedures work and the burden on jurisdictions is reasonable.
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (outlining the role of the Attorney General in the preclearance process).
43. Kousser, supra note 30, at 683 (recognizing that the Department of Justice (DOJ) is restricted to the issuance of guidelines or procedures instead of "rules," and "its objection letters [do] 46 After preclearance is granted, while parties can pursue legal action against the voting changes under Section 2 of the VRA 47 or another legal theory, the benefits of Section 5 are lost. This means the voting changes can be enforced, absent a court injunction, and the burden of proof is shifted away from the jurisdiction and onto the plaintiff alleging illegal voting discrimination.
Even before initial passage in 1965, some members of Congress raised concerns about the "multitude of opportunities for political manipulation by an Attorney General who is inclined to do so." 48 Politics may very well have been the reason for the painfully slow implementation and enforcement of Section 5 after its enactment in 1965. 49 Since DOJ is an executive agency and the Attorney General is a member of the President's Cabinet, an Attorney General may be receptive to the political motivations and considerations of the President's party. Absent adequate safeguards, political manipulation is almost a certainty. Three recent examples deserve mention.
Mississippi Redistricting Plan
Mississippi is covered by Section 5 50 and must obtain preclearance 56. See Liu, supra note 52, at 82-83 ("[T]he political staff rejected the recommendation [of the career staff] and instead extended the review period to seek more information from the state on whether the fact that a state court, not a state legislature, had ordered the [redistricting] plan would affect preclearance, despite no legal basis to think it would."); Rich et al., supra note 53, at 36-37 (finding the delay "highly irregular" since the requested information would not affect the ultimate preclearance decision and that it was "perhaps unprecedented for the Division's political staff to override a unanimous staff recommendation to preclear a submitted change").
57. See 28 C.F.R. app. pt. 51. 58. Memorandum from the Dep't of Justice Voting Section on Section 5 Recommendation 66, 69 (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/texasDOJmemo.pdf (finding that the plan also has the effect of diminishing, or retrogressing, the voting strength of minorities in the state). ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
[64:2 they recommended that preclearance be denied. 59 The Attorney General ignored the staff's recommendations and granted preclearance six days later. 60 The decision by a Republican Attorney General in support of a redistricting plan that strongly favored Republicans was roundly criticized as representing political manipulation of the preclearance process. 61 Since grants of preclearance need not be explained and are not reviewable, 62 opponents had no real recourse.
Georgia Voter Identification Law
The 2005 Georgia law required that voters show government-issued photo identification before voting. 63 After analysis, career staff at DOJ concluded Georgia had failed to prove the law would not have a discriminatory effect and recommended preclearance be denied. 64 The DOJ staff expressed concern that the facts indicated a drastically disproportionate number of African-Americans, as compared to whites, lacked the requisite identification. 65 , available at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/279907/doj-south-carolina-voting.pdf (denying preclearance to South Carolina's voter ID law, noting that "minority registered voters were nearly 20% more likely to lack" the requisite identification and that while "non-white voters comprised 30.4% of the state's registered voters, they constituted 34.2% of registered voters who did not" possess the mandated identification).
66. See Tokaji, supra note 60, at 816-17 (suggesting the appearance of political motivation created by granting preclearance apparently without even considering the prepared memorandum of the career staff); POSNER, supra note 65, at 15 (noting that, despite a longstanding practice, the memorandum was not even sent to the Assistant Attorney General before preclearance was granted).
67. See Kennedy, supra note 55, at 220 (observing that, of the investigation team, those who had recommended denying preclearance were reprimanded while the lone supporter of preclearance was financially rewarded); POSNER, supra note 65, at 13-15 (concluding that the lack of consideration given the recommendations of the career staff raises "questions about the DOJ's commitment to nonpolitical decisionmaking"); see also 72 The infiltration of politics into the decisionmaking process vitiates Section 5 and these examples of potential political abuse beg for reform to better ensure protection and insulation of the system from bias.
The Effects of Section 5
Section 5 has been tremendously successful. Since its passage in 1965, the covered jurisdictions have experienced massive gains in minority voter registration and turnout. 73 Enormous increases in the number of minority elected officials correspond with this growth in registration and turnout. In 1965 there were roughly 300 African-American elected officials nationally, 74 compared to over 9,100 in 2006. 75 Over 46% of these 9,100 officials hold office in covered jurisdictions. 76 While these numbers alone cannot show the entire picture, they suggest a transformation of the political system in the covered jurisdictions into something more in line with the ideals of the Fifteenth Amendment.
II. THE DEBATE ON SECTION 5'S CONSTITUTIONALITY

A. Why It Was Constitutional
When Congress passed the VRA in 1965, it did so by reference to section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, identifying the VRA as "appropriate legislation" to enforce the prohibitions against abridgments on the right to 71 . vote. 77 Almost immediately, South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of some key sections, including Section 5 and the coverage formula in Section 4(b). 78 While South Carolina asserted multiple objections to provisions of the VRA, the core question before the Court became whether "Congress exercised its powers under the Fifteenth Amendment in an appropriate manner with relation to the States." 79 In determining the standard of review, the Court stated that when considered "against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting." 80 The reasonable and vitally important implication is that the Fifteenth Amendment, and "appropriate legislation" passed in its enforcement, supersedes the constitutional rights of the states. 81 In its analysis, the Supreme Court recognized that Section 5 may be an "uncommon exercise of congressional power" but it also stated that whether the legislation is appropriate depends on the conditions and circumstances facing Congress. 82 The Court acknowledged that case-bycase litigation had been ineffective at dealing with voting discrimination, 80. Id. at 324-26 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (reaching this standard based on the fact that the Constitution supersedes state law, explicitly grants Congress power to enforce the right to vote "by appropriate legislation," and prior precedent has granted Congress "full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting"). The Court quoted precedent concerning Congress's power under the Civil War Amendments:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power. Id. at 327 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879)).
81. See id. at 325 (recognizing that "the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power" and that Congress is granted express authority to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment).
82. See id. at 334. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [64:2 noting for emphasis a suit in Dallas County that lasted over four years and had no marked effect on minority voter registration. 83 The Court then turned to the coverage formula and found that Congress had reliable information indicating most of the covered jurisdictions had engaged in voting discrimination. 84 The Court ultimately upheld Section 5 with its decision hinging on two key findings: first, Congress knew of the persistence and creativity of the methods of voting discrimination; and second, Congress had reason to believe the covered states "might try similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the remedies" of the VRA. 85 Given these "exceptional conditions" and "unique circumstances," the Court concluded that the VRA, including Section 5, was appropriate legislation under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. 86 South Carolina also challenged the coverage formula by arguing voting discrimination did not exist in all of the covered jurisdictions. The Court was not swayed, holding instead that the formula "was relevant to the problem of voting discrimination," and thus Congress could "infer a significant danger of the evil in [those] few remaining" covered jurisdictions. 87 By looking to aggregate inferences, the Court thereby indicated it would not require evidence of discrimination in every political subdivision that was brought under Section 5 coverage.
B. Section 5's Continuing Constitutionality
The question of the present constitutionality of Section 5 is the subject of vigorous legal discussion. While this debate has persisted since the initial enactment of the VRA and Section 5, the ever-increasing age of the coverage formula and the clear advancements in racial equality have sharpened the disagreement. 84. See id. at 329-30 (requiring nothing more than "reliable evidence" of voting discrimination and a coverage formula that is "relevant to the problem" to hold that coverage is constitutional overturning Section 5 in its current form.
Concerns About the Coverage Formula
A central issue in the debate on Section 5's constitutionality is the coverage formula. Congress set out an explicit formula in the VRA, and DOJ has no authority to modify it. 89 Despite calls by some prominent legal scholars to update the coverage of Section 5 in the 2006 Reauthorization Act, 90 Congress chose not to amend the formula. 91 Considering the political issues involved with any attempt to reform the coverage of Section 5, this is not surprising. 92 But this means that coverage continues to be based on the conditions of the country in 1964, 1968, and 1972.
One of the most common criticisms of the coverage formula is that the outdated formula results in coverage that is increasingly both over-and under-inclusive. 93 While any set coverage formula will inevitably be imperfect, those imperfections will be exacerbated as the underlying data age and demographics change. Congress did, however, amass an extensive record of evidence supporting the proposition that purposeful voting discrimination is still a significant problem in many of the covered jurisdictions. 94 Since the Supreme Court has never required Congress to 91. See Persily, Promise and Pitfalls, supra note 23, at 207. 92. See id. at 210-11 (discussing political obstacles to expanding the coverage of Section 5 including the fact that Congress was controlled by Republicans when many of the uncovered jurisdictions with significant and recent alleged voting discrimination were Republican-leaning districts).
93. See 152 CONG. REC. 14,273-74 (2006) (statement of Rep. Charlie Norwood) (arguing that the VRA has resolved the offenses that it targeted in 1964 and that the coverage formula should be updated to ensure protection for all areas needing it); Thernstrom, supra note 9, at 47, 72-76 (calling the current coverage "increasingly arbitrary" as demographics shift and race relations evolve); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
94 prove the existence of voting discrimination in all the jurisdictions that ultimately fall under coverage, it is possible the Supreme Court may find this legislative record sufficient to justify the reauthorization of Section 5. 95 But beyond the Supreme Court's potential concerns, the over-and underinclusiveness of the coverage formula raises issues of effectiveness and fairness. Congress confronted the problem of over-inclusiveness by implementing a bailout provision. 96 While this provision is not perfect, 97 it does provide covered jurisdictions with an avenue to remove coverage and thus, to some degree, allows coverage to adapt to advances in voting equality. Congress also confronted the issue of under-inclusiveness through Section 3(c), sometimes referred to as the "pocket trigger" or "bail-in mechanism," 98 which allows a court, in granting relief in a voting rights proceeding, to "retain jurisdiction for such period as it may deem appropriate" and thus essentially require the jurisdiction seek preclearance from that court or from DOJ. 99 Despite their usefulness, these two provisions have been used sparingly and have not had much effect on Section 5's coverage. 100 While the over-inclusiveness of the coverage formula may pose a significant challenge to the constitutionality of Section 5, its underinclusiveness will also be an important factor. Indeed, some of the most , available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/lccr2.pdf (stating that Section 3(c), called the "pocket trigger," has been used sparingly but has "served as an important deterrent to discrimination where it has been used"); cf. Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585, 600 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (observing the scarcity of cases discussing Section 3(c) and noting that none clarify the situations under which Section 3(c) should be used). For a historical account of Section 3(c), see Crum, supra note 98, at 2010-15.
2012]
PRESERVING THE ARK OF OUR SAFETY 549 flagrant violations of voting rights occur in uncovered jurisdictions. 101 It is unclear if any of these violations represent a systematic discriminatory approach, thus warranting possible Section 5 coverage. What is clear is that in analyzing Section 5's constitutionality, the Supreme Court will consider whether voting discrimination is "concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance." 102 In answering this question, both the overand under-inclusiveness of the coverage will be carefully examined. Thus, any recommended reforms aimed at strengthening the constitutionality of Section 5 must confront both issues.
Why Section 5 Remains a Constitutional Exercise of Congressional Power
Congress created Section 5's coverage formula to single out those jurisdictions with the "longest and most egregious histories of entrenched voting discrimination." 103 Thus, evidence of voting discrimination in uncovered jurisdictions, standing alone, is insufficient to support a conclusion that Section 5 is no longer constitutional. To answer the question of constitutionality, it must be determined whether voting discrimination and the risk of future discrimination still exist in covered jurisdictions at sufficient levels to justify singling them out for coverage. 104 The record Congress amassed in support of the 2006 Reauthorization Act is enormous, numbering over 15,000 pages and including numerous hearings, statements, studies, and documented instances of 104. See NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2510, 2512 (recognizing that Section 5 had been upheld in the past based on a determination that "circumstances continued to justify the provisions," and questioning whether coverage still accurately represented jurisdictions with a disproportionate tendency towards racial discrimination). ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [64:2 discrimination. 105 It provides convincing support for the continued need for Section 5. Despite the undeniable improvement in overall race relations, strong evidence exists to support the assertion that voting discrimination is still entrenched in many of the covered jurisdictions. 106 Voting discrimination lawsuits filed under Section 2 of the VRA 107 provide a means for comparison between covered and uncovered jurisdictions. These lawsuits could support a finding that covered areas still warrant being singled out. In a comparison of 331 lawsuits involving alleged Section 2 violations since 1982, a study by the Voting Rights Initiative found that of the 123 that resulted in a successful outcome for the plaintiff, 68 (about 55%) came from covered jurisdictions. 108 This is especially significant considering that less than 25% of the national population resides in covered jurisdictions. While we have made enormous progress, it takes time to overcome the deep-seated patterns of behavior that have denied minorities full access to the ballot. Indeed, the worst thing we could do would be to allow that progress to slip away because we ended the cure too soon. We know that the act is having an impact. We know that it is deterring discrimination. And we know that despite the act, racial bloc voting and other forms of discrimination continue to tilt the playing field for minority voters and candidates. We need to ensure that jurisdictions know that the act will be in force for a sufficiently long period that they cannot simply wait for its expiration, but must eliminate discrimination root and branch. 110 Such studies support the assertion that voting discrimination has not been purged from the covered jurisdictions and is still present at a disproportionate level when compared to the uncovered jurisdictions. Proposed voting changes and corresponding preclearance objections also provide evidence of continued entrenchment of racial discrimination in covered jurisdictions. In a study analyzing DOJ preclearance objections, discriminatory intent or purpose was a legal basis for 74% of objections handed down in the 1990s. 111 This further supports the contention that intentional voter discrimination is still present in the covered jurisdictions. Notably, between 1965 and 2005, not one Louisiana redistricting plan, in its initially submitted form, has received preclearance. 112 Louisiana is not ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [64:2 the only jurisdiction to have its redistricting proposals denied preclearance, and if not for Section 5 these redistricting plans might have significantly reduced the voting power of minorities in those jurisdictions. 113 Considering that redistricting plans are often in effect for at least a decade, they can be an extremely effective means of marginalizing the voting power of minorities: in this regard, the importance of Section 5 cannot be overstated. 114 Beyond examples of attempted voting discrimination, there is the additional deterrent effect of preclearance, which has likely prevented numerous discriminatory changes from ever being proposed-but this deterrent effect is so far impossible to measure. 115 Unlike most situations where a court analyzes the constitutionality of a remedial statute, this is not a case where Congress promulgated the statute for the first time. 116 In reauthorizing the VRA, Congress dealt with an existing statute, and courts should acknowledge that for the past forty-seven years Section 5 has been actively preventing the type of discrimination that initially justified it as a constitutional remedy. 117 The very effectiveness of Section 5 will thus have an obvious and significant impact on the ability of Congress to amass evidence of continued need. 118 While a court should not simply show obeisance to Congress and defer to its conclusions, it should Democratic Attorneys General to abridge the right to vote on account of race or color or membership in language in a minority group."). 116. Persily, Promise and Pitfalls, supra note 23, at 193 ("The new VRA was quite different from other laws either upheld or struck down post-Boerne: (1) the bill proposed renewal of existing legislation, not drafting a law from scratch; and (2) the law would not apply nationwide." (footnotes omitted)).
117. 
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PRESERVING THE ARK OF OUR SAFETY 553 judge the VRA accordingly by applying a slightly different measure than it would in the examination of a newly passed statute. It should place greater weight on evidence indicating possible deleterious effects of removing the statute, 119 and correspondingly require less evidence of the egregious types of violations the statute was intended to prevent. Congress enacted the VRA "to foster our transformation to a society that is no longer fixated on race." 120 This has yet to be fully realized. While Section 5 has prevented the enforcement of discriminatory practices, it has yet to cure the behavior and mentality that is the root of the problem. 121 Since case-by-case adjudication of voting discrimination remains as ineffective today as it was in 1965, 122 and there is still a disproportionate risk of voting discrimination in the covered jurisdictions, 123 the circumstances continue to justify Section 5. 124 Section 5 therefore remains a constitutional exercise of Congress's power. 125 119. See Persily, Promise and Pitfalls, supra note 23, at 194 & n.76 ("Evidence that a law is being complied with is not a reason to do away with it. If there were an environmental regulation that limited pollution levels, cleaner air would not signify that it is no longer needed, but rather that it is sufficiently serving its purpose. So long as the risk of pollution continues that law would need to be renewed." Since a Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of Section 5 will likely come down to whether it deems the legislative findings adequate to support the need for Section 5, the outcome implicitly depends on "judicial attitudes and the Justices [sic] own views about the legislation under review." 126 For those who support Section 5 and its continuation, the Supreme Court's decision in NAMUDNO brought dark tidings. While technically avoiding the issue of constitutionality and instead reaching a decision based on statutory interpretation, 127 the Court included language that clearly indicates it has serious concerns about the constitutional muster of Section 5. One of these concerns centers on whether the coverage of Section 5 represents the "current political conditions," given that the data used for the coverage formula is over thirty-five years old. 128 The Court recognized Section 5's success, but made clear that "the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs. 126. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 15, at 104, 130 (concluding that the question of the constitutionality of Section 5 will also come down to "whether the Court can muster the will to strike down the most effective civil rights statute in history"); see Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Understanding the Paradoxical Case of the Voting Rights Act, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 701 (2009) (asserting that in the past the Court has deferred to Congress and refused to subject the VRA to serious scrutiny, thus making the future question of constitutionality simply a matter of whether the Court will continue this deference).
127. See NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2516-17 (avoiding the constitutional question and instead ruling that "political subdivisions," within the meaning of the VRA, includes the appellant and thus allows the appellant to apply for a bailout from coverage).
128. Id. at 2512. 129. Id. 130. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) ("There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."); see also Shelby Cnty., 811 F. Supp. 2d at 461-62 (concluding that the congruence and proportionality test is the appropriate standard for reviewing Section 5).
131. 133 Because the Court avoided the constitutional question, much of its discussion on this issue had nothing to do with the ultimate holding-which makes such dicta portentous. The NAMUDNO opinion seems to go out of its way to question the constitutional standing of Section 5 even while ultimately avoiding the issue, and this may be a not-so-thinly veiled warning of things to come.
Any defense of the constitutionality of Section 5 must center on its current need and the legislative record compiled during its passage. To justify the continued differential treatment of covered areas, Congress must not only show the subsistence of voting rights violations, but also that some "systematic differences exist between the currently covered and non-covered jurisdictions." 134 In his testimony to Congress, Professor Pildes stressed that modern-day voter discrimination, which often involves vote dilution instead of outright violence, is different from the issues for which the VRA was originally created to target and is no longer "concentrated in any one discrete part of the country." 135 Also important to the debate is the undeniable success of Section 5. This success has, in many cases, prevented discriminatory actions by covered jurisdictions from ever going into effect, either through deterrence or denial of preclearance, and has thus further diminished the evidence of purposeful discrimination in covered areas. 136 These factors have led some scholars to question seriously whether Section 5 will survive the Supreme Court's test for constitutionality. 137 Despite the tone of the NAMUDNO decision, which is somewhat hostile to Section 5, the Supreme Court did not actually strike down Section 5. Scholars have advanced some possible explanations for this: first, and most hopeful for supporters of Section 5, is that there simply were not enough , at 564, 580-81 (arguing that the lack of an adequate legislative record, when combined with the violation of federalism, makes Section 5 an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's authority); Hasen, supra note 115, at 206-07 (concluding that it is unclear whether Congress will be able to amass sufficient evidence to satisfy the congruence and proportionality test especially considering the increased weight the Court has put on federalism concerns in recent years); Pitts, supra note 11, at 249-68 (providing an in-depth discussion on this question and concluding that Section 5 will likely not meet the congruence and proportionality test 139 This second explanation-undeniably implicating the politics of the Court-means that the future of Section 5 may hinge on the unpredictability of the Supreme Court's tolerance for controversy and the willingness of the individual justices to dismantle "one of the crown jewels of the civil rights movement." 140 A third possible explanation views NAMUDNO as a call on Congress to act and amend the VRA. 141 One thing is certain: the constitutionality of Section 5 under the current Supreme Court is highly questionable at best. 142 The following recommendations will bring Section 5's scope and application more clearly
PRESERVING THE ARK OF OUR SAFETY 557 within the Court's constitutional limits and thus help save this foundational measure of the Civil Rights movement.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States has made great strides toward equality since the passage of the Voting Rights Act. 143 Despite this, discrimination still poisons the voting system. While blatant acts of racism have decreased, there are still concerted and consistent efforts to discriminate against minority voters. 144 The coalescence of minorities toward a common political party 145 can transform discussions of institutionalized discrimination into a less polarized vocabulary as voting discrimination is more easily attributed to political motivations and biases. 146 Since case-bycase adjudication remains inefficient and ineffective, 147 Section 5 is an invaluable weapon in the enforcement of Fifteenth Amendment rights. Successful reforms must accomplish three things: first, they must reinforce the constitutionality of Section 5; second, they must increase its effectiveness at preventing voting discrimination; finally, they must help guard against political abuse in the enforcement of Section 5.
A. Reforms to Confront Political Bias
"A democracy works best when the people have all the information that the security of the Nation permits. No one should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public interest." 148 Accordingly, to confront the potential for political bias within the preclearance decisionmaking process, Congress should enact specific reporting requirements for Section 5 and allow limited appeals of grants of preclearance.
This would add more transparency and accountability to the system, and would serve as a significant safeguard for ensuring the apolitical bases for preclearance decisions. 
Requirement for an Inclusive Administrative Record
One such reporting requirement should be the creation of a public administrative record for every preclearance decision. 149 There already is a record requirement for all Section 5 submissions, 150 but it should be expanded and codified by statute. 151 This requirement should be modeled after DOJ's own 1999 guidance document and include all "documents and materials which were before or available to the decision-making office at the time the decision was made." 152 Additionally, to ensure transparency of the decisionmaking process, the record should also include " [d] ocuments that relate to both the substance and procedure of making the decision." 153 If preclearance is either denied or explicitly granted, the record should include an order laying out the evidence relied upon, the conclusions drawn from that evidence, and the reasoning behind the ultimate decision, including why any contradictory evidence was unconvincing. 154 There are also those situations in which DOJ simply does not respond to a request for preclearance within sixty days, thus effectively granting preclearance. 155 To confront this, any affected party 156 should be allowed to submit a request to DOJ demanding a reasoned explanation for a decision at any time up to
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PRESERVING THE ARK OF OUR SAFETY 559 fourteen days after the expiration of the initial sixty days. Once a request is submitted, the jurisdiction should not be allowed to enforce the change for which they are seeking preclearance until DOJ releases an official decision, complete with all the requirements mentioned above.
Requiring an inclusive record would better ensure the process is open to public and political scrutiny, creating additional pressure to make reasoned decisions based on the law as opposed to political bias. This may result in a heavier workload for DOJ, but it is a reasonable price to pay given the importance and lasting effect of preclearance decisions.
Allow the Appeal of Grants of Preclearance
A record would also serve a vital role during an appeal of DOJ preclearance decisions. 157 Currently, a DOJ denial of preclearance is not appealable, though the jurisdiction may subsequently request preclearance-called declaratory judgment in the VRA-from the District Court for the District of Columbia, essentially resulting in a new preclearance proceeding. 158 This would not change. The record would serve no inherent role in the preclearance process unless the parties choose to use it in their case, and even then it would be subject to no deference.
Congress should also allow appeals of granted preclearance 159 to be brought by qualifying persons 160 before the District Court for the District of Columbia, with a two-tier system of review. For decisions that concern redistricting or explicit preconditions to voting or registering to vote-such as identification requirements or good behavior prerequisites-the standard of review should be de novo. This standard represents the importance of hose representing minority voters should have a chance to police the policer by challenging the DOJ's decisions to preclear a change in court."); Tokaji, supra note 60, at 830-32 (proposing allowing the appeal of grants of preclearance as one possible means of combating political manipulation of the Section 5 preclearance process); see Rohlf, supra note 149, at 577 ("With the rise of the modern administrative state and consequent influence of decisions by federal agencies over many aspects of daily life in the United States, protecting the courts' role in reviewing the validity of federal agency decisions is crucial to safeguarding American democracy itself.").
160. Not just anyone should be allowed to appeal a decision. One possibility is to limit it to those "who submitted letters to the DOJ when it was considering the preclearance submission." Persily, Options and Strategies, supra note 90, at 732. At the very least, it should be limited to persons who are residents and eligible voters of the jurisdiction seeking preclearance. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [64:2 decisions regarding redistricting and prerequisites to voting as well as these techniques' heightened ability to successfully discriminate against minority voters. 161 For appeals of other voting changes, the court should analyze DOJ's decision under the Chevron doctrine and overturn it only if it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." 162 This deference would help prevent overloading the court with cases by allowing the quick dismissal of decisions reasonably supported by the record and the law. At the same time, it would help prevent politically biased preclearance decisions by permitting the court a means of overturning such cases.
B. Reform the Bailout Provision
It is not immediately clear why so few jurisdictions have utilized the current bailout provision, 163 but they fact that they have not raises serious concerns about its effectiveness. To remedy this, Congress should allow the creation of a tiered bailout system with each tier representing different classes of voting changes. Congress should mandate that the current bailout requirements remain for the top tier, which would include redistricting changes and imposition of explicit prerequisites to vote or register to vote, but should give DOJ the authority to decide, through notice-and-comment rulemaking, 164 the specifics of the remainder of the new bailout system. 165 This should include the types of voting-related
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PRESERVING THE ARK OF OUR SAFETY 561 changes comprising each tier and the applicable evidentiary requirements for a successful bailout at each level. A tiered system would allow a nondiscriminating jurisdiction, which may be discouraged by the cost and difficulty of meeting the evidentiary burden of the current bailout provision, to choose a less onerous bailout level and regain some independence over its voting system. 166 The reformed bailout provision should make clear that, like the current provision, any proven acts of voting discrimination within the succeeding ten years would result in reversion to complete coverage. 167 This reform strengthens the constitutionality of Section 5 by directly confronting the concern of the Supreme Court that the current provision may make it too difficult for jurisdictions with no history of discrimination to bailout. 168 Further, as more jurisdictions successfully utilize this bailout provision, DOJ's preclearance workload would be reduced, freeing up scarce resources and increasing the agency's effectiveness at enforcing the VRA and preventing voting discrimination. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [64:2
C. A Means to Add Jurisdictions to Coverage
The relatively static structure of Section 5 means that coverage cannot be adapted to respond to changes and developments in demographics, motivations, or constitutional interpretation. 169 As seen with certain responsibilities, such as monetary policy, the slow-moving and politically shackled arms of Congress are often not a successful means of responding to new contingencies or shifting circumstances. 170 The complex responsibility of updating the coverage of Section 5 is better suited for an agency than it is for Congress. For all the congressional hearings and debates on the coverage formula during the 2006 reauthorization, changes never really stood a chance. 171 This is not to say that DOJ should be able to completely scrap and replace the old coverage. There is a strong rationale behind the current coverage and it should not be easily dismissed. 172 Congress should thus set the current coverage as the starting point, but give DOJ the ability to initiate legal proceedings by which jurisdictions may be added to Section 5 coverage. 173 This would allow Section 5 coverage to be tailored to new and changing circumstances and expanded to areas where it is needed.
To add a jurisdiction to Section 5 coverage, Congress should require that DOJ prove, by a preponderance of the evidence and before a threejudge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, a consistent pattern of voting discrimination-either intentional, effectual, or both-and a strong likelihood of continuance into the future absent the requirement of preclearance.
The intricacies of this evidentiary requirement should be deciphered in significantly greater detail through regulations promulgated by DOJ using notice-and-comment rulemaking. 174 This would greatly increase the effectiveness of Section 5 by ensuring that coverage represents, as closely as possible, the areas with the greatest propensity toward discrimination. This reform would also strengthen Section 5's constitutionality 175 by allowing DOJ to extend coverage to jurisdictions where discrimination exists and, when combined with a reformed bailout provision, to ensure that coverage more accurately represents the current state of the country. 176 
CONCLUSION
Section 5 has been an extremely successful tool in the fight against voting discrimination. 177 It has helped produce remarkable increases in minority voter registration and minority representation at all levels of government. 178 The right to vote, the ark of our safety, is more secure today because of this essential provision. Despite this, voting discrimination still persists and the need for protection remains. 179 Section 5 must be reformed both to increase its effectiveness in a new, ever-changing society, and to ensure that 174 . See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 175. The proposed approach would also alleviate the concern that any congressional change to the coverage formula might create additional constitutional infirmities to the entirety of Section 5. Persily, Promise and Pitfalls, supra note 23, at 194, 209. By having DOJ promulgate regulations specifying the evidentiary requirements needed to add a jurisdiction to Section 5's coverage, a court could find the regulations unconstitutional without endangering Section 5's statutory foundation. Additionally, a court would have an opportunity to review each individual attempt to add a jurisdiction to coverage and would thus rule on the legality and constitutionality of each, as opposed to the entire coverage formula.
176. See NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512 (2009) ("The evil that § 5 is meant to address may no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance. The statute's coverage formula is based on data that is now more than 35 years old, and there is considerable evidence that it fails to account for current political conditions.").
177. 
